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This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mitigation-strategy-for-avian-influenza-in-wild-birds-in-england-and-wales/mitigation-strategy-for-avian-influenza-in-wild-birds-in-england-and-wales

1.1 This document sets out the policies and approach Defra and Welsh Government, and their delivery agencies the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA), Natural England and Natural Resources Wales (NRW) take to avian influenza in wild birds in England, within the remit of national law. In addition, the document sets out guidance to the general public and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on issues which may impact them in relation to avian influenza in wild birds.

1.2 Animal health including disease control, and wildlife conservation and management are devolved matters, and it is for the devolved administrations to assess their disease risks and impacts and respond accordingly. However, each of the administrations seek consistent and coordinated response to disease control across Great Britain where possible.

1.3 While this document is applicable to England and Wales only, it aims to support the GB-wide approach to avian influenza control set out in the Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain.

1.4 The contents of this document were prepared in consultation with the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Public Health Wales (PHW), the Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), veterinary and scientific experts, and sector stakeholders.

1.5 This document is structured to set out:

2.1 Avian influenza (‘bird flu’) refers to the disease caused by infection with avian influenza Type A viruses. Wild waterbirds of the orders Anseriformes (for example ducks, geese, and swans) and Charadriiformes (for example gulls, terns, and shorebirds) are considered the natural reservoir of avian influenza viruses, and their migratory patterns and interactions with poultry and other captive birds form the backbone of most established avian influenza transmission networks worldwide.

2.2 Avian influenza viruses are single-stranded, segmented, negative-sense RNA ((‑)ssRNA) viruses and are placed in the family Orthomyxoviridae. At present the Orthomyxoviridae family consists of five genera: Influenzavirus A, Influenzavirus B, Influenzavirus C, Thogotovirus and Isavirus. Only viruses of the Influenzavirus A genus are known to infect birds and those isolated from birds are termed avian influenza viruses. However, while avian influenzas are predominantly considered a pathogen of birds, the virus is zoonotic and can infect other mammals including humans, the ease at which it can infect mammals, and whether it can spread from mammal to mammal varies significantly between strains.

2.3 Avian influenza viruses are also categorised according to the properties of their surface proteins (haemagglutinin (H1-H16) and neuraminidase (N1-N9)). Because the viral RNA of influenza viruses is segmented, genetic reassortment can occur in mixed infections with different strains of influenza A viruses. There are 16 different H proteins and 9 N proteins in influenzas affecting birds and any combination of these is possible. However, the H5 and H7s are considered to be the most important from an animal health perspective, as they are the only subtypes to have been identified as causing a highly pathogenic infection in birds.

2.4 Genetic strain nomenclature for avian influenza viruses is based on: viral type, (for example influenza A), host of origin (if other than human), geographic origin, strain reference number, year of isolation, and H and N type.

2.5 There are many strains of avian influenza viruses, which vary in both their ability to infect humans and other mammals, and their ability to cause disease in birds. In poultry, avian influenza viruses are categorised according to this ability to cause severe disease (pathogenicity) into being either high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) (generally causing severe disease) or low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) (generally being subclinical in poultry). The clinical severity as a result of avian influenza virus infection varies dependent upon both species infected and virus strain.

2.6 Avian influenza is a notifiable animal disease in poultry and other captive birds (not wild birds). Anyone in possession of any bird or bird carcass (excluding a wild bird or wild bird carcass) which they suspect may be infected with avian influenza, or a mammal or mammal carcass which they suspect may be infected with influenza virus of avian origin must immediately notify the APHA. By calling in England the Defra Rural Services Helpline on 03000 200 301. In Wales, contact 0300 303 8268. In Scotland, by contacting the local Field Services Office. Failure to do so is an offence.

3.1 Avian influenza can spread by movement of infected birds, from bird-to-bird by contact with contaminated body fluids and faeces, either directly or through contaminated objects and surfaces, or ingestion of infectious material.

3.2 An avian influenza outbreak can occur at any point in the year. However, avian influenza is not endemic in wild birds in the UK, rather the UK typically faces a seasonal increase in the risk of an avian influenza incursion associated with the winter migration patterns of wild birds to the UK.

3.3 In late autumn or early winter two migration pathways have the potential to carry avian influenza infected wild birds to the UK, typically wild migratory waterfowl:

There are no clear boundaries between these migration routes and birds will mix between them and multiple species can be found at the same sites.

3.4 Infected incoming migratory wild birds can then subsequently infect both other recently arrived migratory wild birds and sedentary wild bird species resulting in local transmission or environmental contamination for example wild bird faecal contamination. Hence why the risk of avian influenza is not solely connected to the presence of infected migratory wild birds.

3.5 The risk of avian influenza being introduced into domestic poultry or other captive birds will depend on the prevalence and pattern of virus shedding in wild birds, the level of biosecurity in place on poultry holdings or bird premises and other factors.

3.6 Detailed epidemiological assessments are made at each poultry and captive bird infected premises to investigate possible source and spread. To-date all available evidence indicates that direct or indirect contact with infected wild birds is the source of infection on almost all of the kept bird premises. Whilst spill-back from poultry to wild birds is possible, there is no evidence from any of the UK cases that wild birds have been infected from these infected premises.

3.7 Reports on the epidemiological investigations for past outbreak have been published on GOV.UK. The report for the 2021 to 2022 outbreak will also be published once finalised.

3.8 In Great Britain the risk of avian influenza incursion during summer typically decreases as environmental conditions (warm, dry, high sunlight exposure) can reduce virus survival in the environment. However, whether a measurable difference in the rate of findings of avian influenza in wild birds is observed is dependent on the background level of transmission of avian influenza, pathogenicity, infectivity and duration of immunity induced associated with the virus strains circulating at the time.

4.1 In England the 2009 England Wildlife Health Strategy provides a policy framework within which Defra is able to develop and make policy decisions in relation to wildlife disease management. It states that government has a responsibility to intervene in wildlife disease issues when:

4.2 In Wales the 2014 Animal Health and Welfare Framework provides the basis within which Welsh Government is able to develop and make policy decisions in relation to wildlife disease management. Its scope includes where ‘wildlife is also covered where our actions affect their health and welfare or where there is a risk of wildlife transmitting disease to other animals or humans’.

4.3 Defra and Welsh Government’s approach to avian influenza in wild birds considers the latest ornithological, epidemiological, veterinary and other scientific advice when considering the current and potential impact of avian influenza in wild birds, against the above criteria and whether viable mitigation measures are available to limit any impacts in wild birds in line with international best practice.

5.1 This approach is consistent with broad animal health and biodiversity policies including:

6.1 Defra and Welsh Government are responsible for responding to outbreaks of exotic animal disease in England and Wales respectively. In both England and Wales APHA are the primary delivery agents, supported by Natural England and NRW in England and Wales respectively with regard to environmental and wildlife impacts.

6.2 In England the Defra Secretary of State (SoS) and ministers have overall responsibility for and oversight of the outbreak response. The relevant Defra minister will be involved in strategic decision making, working closely with the UK Chief Veterinary Officer (UK CVO) and senior officials. In Wales Welsh Ministers are responsible for decision making related to outbreak response, and biodiversity.

6.3 The United Kingdom Health Security Agency (UKHSA) and Public Health Wales (PHW) are the lead bodies for the human public health response in England and Wales respectively, working with NHS England, NHS Wales and local authority partners who facilitate the response. Regional UKHSA and PHW Health Protection Teams work closely with Defra and Welsh Government respectively to monitor the situation and providing health advice to any exposed persons. Appropriate action is taken by UKHSA in England to protect public health in line with the national guidance for managing the human health risk of avian influenza in poultry and wild birds and by PHW in Wales in line with Public Health Wales Avian Influenza Standard Operating Procedure.

6.4 The Animal Disease Policy Group (ADPG) provides disease control policy advice and strategic recommendations at UK level which will form the basis for advice to Defra ministers, Welsh Government Ministers, the Civil Contingencies Committee (COBR) and other strategic decision makers. It is the forum where the disease control policy and strategic recommendations are presented, reviewed, discussed, challenged and agreed by officials. Noting however, that decisions regarding species recovery initiatives outside of those directly linked to disease prevention and control are outside the scope of ADPG.

6.5 The ADPG also has an important role in ensuring that policies are consistent (although they may be different) across the four administrations within the UK. ADPG is chaired by Defra’s director for Animal and Plant Health and Welfare and Defra’s Exotic Disease Policy Response Team (EDPRT) provides the secretariat. The membership of the ADPG includes representatives from Defra policy teams, communications group, Defra legal advisers (animal health and welfare team), UK CVO, Defra Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) representative, National Experts Group (NEG), CVO’s and policy officials from devolved governments, Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and APHA. Membership may also include food safety and public health representatives (who provide specific advice on zoonotic diseases).

6.6 Further details on the ADPG and the overarching command and control structure of the response to outbreaks of exotic disease are outlined in the Contingency Plan for Exotic Notifiable Diseases of Animals in England and Welsh Government’s Exotic Animal Diseases Contingency Plan. Scotland and Northern Ireland also maintain contingency plans. The UK contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals explains how the administrations work together in responding to an outbreak at a UK level. Taken together, these plans and the published disease control strategies for specific exotic diseases meet the UK’s obligations to our international trading partners and the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH).

7.1 Defra and Welsh Government’s disease control measures seek to contain the number of animals that need to be culled, either for disease control purposes or to safeguard animal welfare. Our approach aims to reduce adverse impacts on the rural and wider economy, the public, rural communities and the environment (including impact on wildlife), whilst protecting public health and minimising the overall cost of any outbreak.

7.2 Defra and Welsh Government’s objective in tackling any outbreak of avian influenza in kept birds is to eradicate the disease as quickly as possible from the UK poultry and captive-bird population and regain UK WOAH disease-free status.

7.3 Defra and Welsh Government’s approach in kept birds is set out in the Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain. In summary in poultry and other captive birds following confirmation of notifiable avian influenza, swift and humane culling of kept birds on infected premises coupled with good biosecurity aims to prevent the amplification of avian influenza and subsequent environmental contamination and to reduce the risk of disease spread from infected premises to other kept birds, wild birds or other animals. Current policy is in line with international standards of best practice for disease control. It reflects our experience of responding to past outbreaks of exotic animal disease.

7.4 In wild birds Defra and Welsh Government’s approach to avian influenza seeks to align with our targets on protecting species abundance and diversity. Managing disease in wild birds is part of a wider package of work on species recovery. In relation to avian influenza Defra and Welsh Government aim to monitor the presence of avian influenza in the wild bird population to inform our understanding on how the disease is distributed geographically and in different types of wild bird to:

8.1 APHA carry out routine surveillance of disease risks both in the UK and around the world to help Government anticipate future threats to animal health. APHA continue to closely monitor the global situation of avian influenza as part of this work.

8.2 APHA virologists and epidemiologists collaborate with colleagues in Europe and around the world to closely analyse viruses involved in both outbreaks in poultry and other captive birds and those found in wild birds, with the aim of trying to understand what makes these viruses different and how they might change in the future. This work is facilitated through the WOAH and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) international reference laboratory for Avian Influenza located at APHA Weybridge.

8.3 The latest risk and outbreak assessments by APHA are published and available on GOV.UK at as part of the ‘Animal diseases: international and UK monitoring’ collection.

8.4 Further information on APHA’s wider work to monitor avian disease threats can also be found in the ‘Avian: GB disease surveillance and emerging threats reports’ and the ‘Wildlife: GB disease surveillance and emerging threats reports’ on GOV.UK.

9.1 The Ornithological Expert Panel (OEP) is an APHA-chaired expert group consisting of members of the British Trust for Ornithology (BTO), Wildfowl & Wetland Trust (WWT), Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB), British Association for Shooting and Conservation (BASC), JNCC, Natural England, NatureScot, NRW and APHA.

9.2 The OEP can be called on for the provision of expert advice to support the development of policy.

9.3 The OEP is an advisory group, it does not have decision-making powers. Its role is to provide veterinary technical and scientific evidence in response to specific questions on a developing policy. The OEP does not advise on disease control strategy, although the evidence it gives should support a policy team in identifying options.

9.4 The OEP does not replace existing sources of expertise available to policy makers either directly or indirectly but will be used where it provides the best forum for allowing interaction between experts within and across disciplines to resolve a specific issue or to supplement the existing advice.

9.5 The OEP may be set up in either:

9.6 The timescale for assembling an OEP once the need is identified is rapid, typically between 24 to 48 hours.

10.1 The main clinical signs of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in birds (which can include any or a combination of the following) are:

10.2 Clinical signs can vary between species of bird and some species (for example ducks and geese) may show minimal clinical signs.

10.3 Low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) is usually less serious and may show more vague clinical signs. For example, it may cause mild breathing problems but affected birds will not always show clear signs of infection. The severity of LPAI depends on the type of bird and its general health status.

10.4 While the clinical signs outlined above can indicate avian influenza, the presence of avian influenza virus can only be confirmed through laboratory tests.

11.1 The National Reference Laboratory (NRL) for Avian Influenza is located at the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) Weybridge Laboratory.

11.2 All diagnostic testing conducted at the avian influenza NRL uses United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) validated tests and is in line with WOAH standards as set out for Avian Influenza in the WOAH Terrestrial Manual.

11.3 Details of all UKAS validated front line diagnostic assays used by the avian influenza NRL can be found in the public domain at FluGlobalNet: Laboratory Protocols.

12.1 APHA carries out year-round avian influenza surveillance of dead wild birds submitted via public reports and warden patrols across Great Britain on behalf of Defra, Welsh Government and Scottish Government.

12.2 The public are encouraged to report findings of dead wild birds to the Defra helpline (03459 335577). Reports to the Defra Helpline of found dead wild birds are triaged and not all birds will be collected. The criteria for which birds are collected (species and numbers) are adjusted to increase or decrease the sensitivity of surveillance. Adjustments to the surveillance criteria are discussed and agreed through the ADPG. The latest criteria used for triage by the Defra helpline are published on the guidance page: Avian Influenza (bird flu)

12.3 APHA and their contractors then collect some of these birds for testing at the APHA National Reference Laboratory to help us understand the risk posed to poultry and other captive birds in addition to the risk to different species groups of wild birds is through understanding how the disease is distributed geographically and in different types of wild bird.

12.4 The surveillance programme will not collect further wild bird carcasses from the same location (defined as a 3km radius of where the birds were found) and once carcasses have been collected from a given location, we will not collect any more carcasses of the same species for at least 14 days.

12.5 A maximum of 5 birds will be collected from a particular location for testing when a mass die-off is reported. Testing becomes unreliable as carcasses decompose, so if, after four days from the report, there has been no collection or no contact can be made with the person reporting the whereabouts of the carcasses, the carcasses will not be collected and will need to be disposed of appropriately (see section 21 for further information).

12.6 Collection and submission of dead wild birds which have been identified by APHA as required for avian influenza surveillance purposes will be arranged by APHA through their contractor UK Farmcare, who will deliver them to official veterinary laboratories for post-mortem inspection and testing at the avian influenza National Reference Laboratory.

12.7 APHA publish a report (updated weekly) on findings of HPAI in wild birds in Great Britain.

13.1 In England and Wales, the APHA Diseases of Wildlife Scheme (DoWS) provides surveillance in wildlife for new and emerging diseases on behalf of government. Since 2009, surveillance for vertebrate (apart from cetacean) wildlife disease in GB has been the responsibility of the Great Britain Wildlife Health Surveillance Partnership, under the Chair of the APHA DoWS.

13.2 The GB Wildlife Health Surveillance Partnership includes APHA, SRUC Veterinary Services, Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas), Forestry England, Wildfowl & Wetlands Trust (WWT), Natural England (NE), Institute of Zoology (IoZ) and the Garden Wildlife Health (GWH) project.

13.3 The GWH is a collaborative project between the Zoological Society of London (ZSL), the BTO, Froglife and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) which aims to monitor the health of, and identify disease threats to, specified species of British wildlife (amphibians, reptiles, hedgehogs and garden birds).

13.4 Wild birds are susceptible to a range of diseases and injuries and not all dead birds will have been infected with avian influenza. The APHA DoWS supports the work of the avian influenza NRL, together with investigating significant wild bird mortality or morbidity events in wild birds where avian influenza is either not suspected or suspicion has been negated.

13.5 In addition, while avian influenza viruses are predominantly considered a pathogen of birds, the virus can infect mammals. While there is no routine surveillance for avian influenza in wild mammals, where appropriate, wild mammals including seals are tested for avian influenza in collaboration with the APHA avian influenza National Reference Laboratory. Causes of death of wild seals are monitored and investigated in England and Wales by both the Cetacean Stranding Investigation Programme and the APHA DoWS.

13.6 In addition where required wildlife investigations are supported by the Wildlife Incident Investigation Scheme (WIIS) run by Natural England on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in England, and in Wales by Welsh Government The scheme makes enquiries into the death or illness of wildlife, pets and beneficial invertebrates that may have resulted from pesticide poisoning.

14.1 The integration of surveillance activities with research is essential to continue the expansion of our understanding of avian influenza epidemiology within wildlife populations. Including identifying new host species and viral reservoirs and supporting horizon scanning for strains circulating elsewhere which may threaten the UK. In combination with molecular and virological studies, research may allow the identification of viral subtypes of particular concern (such as expressing molecular patterns associated with increased virulence, viral replication, or cross-species transmission) and help to focus resources where they are likely to be of greatest benefit.

14.2 In June 2022 a new consortium ‘FluMap’ was launched, funded by Defra and the Biotechnology and Biosciences Research Council (BBSRC) bringing together experts from the UK’s leading research bodies, led by Defra and APHA. The consortium aims to deliver research into how avian influenza viruses are emerging in wild populations and help us understand the risk posed to both domestic and wild birds including why some bird species are more resistant to avian influenza strains.

14.3 The research gaps addressed by the consortium were identified from the recent STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium Animal Influenza Research Review and knowledge gaps identified during recent avian influenza outbreaks.

14.4 The STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium is a global initiative aiming to coordinate research programmes at the international level and to contribute to the development of new and improved animal health strategies for priority diseases, infections and issues.

15.1 Through the APHA wild bird surveillance scheme during the 2021 into 2022 outbreak at the time of publication avian influenza had been detected in over 60 different species of wild birds. Including in England breeding populations of seabird species listed as Great Britain Birds of Conservation Concern (BoCC5), including:

15.2 In England, of particular concern are high levels of mortality of BoCC5 red-listed Roseate Terns at the UK’s only breeding colony of this species on Coquet Island in Northumberland, and high levels of mortality at Sandwich Tern breeding colonies in Northumberland and Norfolk.

15.3 Concerns are emerging following confirmation of avian influenza in gannets (amber-listed BoCC5 species) on Grassholm Island off the Pembrokeshire coast in Wales; the largest of only two colonies of this BoCC5 species in Wales. Avian influenza has also been detected in Black-headed Gulls (amber-listed BoCC5 species) in Wales.

15.4 There is concern that high levels of mortality caused by avian influenza could have serious impacts on England and Wales’s breeding seabird populations.

15.5 Avian influenza has also been detected in other species of conservation concern, including White-tailed Eagle (red-listed BoCC5 species) and Hen Harrier (red-listed BoCC5 species). Birds of prey are susceptible to avian influenza and can be infected if exposed, either directly through contact with other birds, through the ingestion of infected material where the birds of prey feed on other infected birds or scavenge infectious material, or indirectly via contact with environmental contamination.

15.6 For the latest information on wild bird species effected by avian influenza see the latest APHA outbreak assessments which are published and available on GOV.UK :‘Animal diseases: international and UK monitoring.

15.7 Long-term population monitoring is crucial to understanding the impacts of the disease on England and Wales’s seabird populations. Population monitoring of seabird populations in England and Wales (and the rest of the UK) is done under the BTO and JNCC Seabird Monitoring Programme (SMP), which is jointly funded by the BTO and JNCC, in association with the RSPB.

15.8 Further to this existing monitoring, in light of the unprecedented scale of the avian influenza outbreak during the 2021 to 2022 outbreak season and the impacts in particular of infection at seabird breeding colonies, Natural England and NRW have created a mortality reporting system for key seabird colonies in England and Wales respectively. The evidence collected through this system will help to support the work done by the APHA on monitoring the spread of the disease and will help with assessing the impacts of the disease on England and Wales’s seabird populations.

15.9 Understanding the spread and impacts of the disease within these populations will help to inform future species recovery programmes and to identify potential collective actions which could mitigate the long-term impact of avian influenza on seabird populations.

16.1 The UK’s seabirds are an important part of our natural heritage, and their protection is a high priority for the government. England and Wales support internationally significant populations of breeding seabirds. Most of these species are species of conservation concern in the UK (BoCC5 red or amber-listed). Defra and Welsh Government recognise the significant threat HPAI poses to our seabird populations, especially when infection and transmission occur during the sensitive nesting period.

16.2 Defra are looking to support the resilience in existing seabird populations and have built a comprehensive network of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), which include sites to protect seabirds, and are now focusing on ensuring our MPAs and Special Protection Areas (SPAs) are properly protected. In addition, accidental capture (bycatch) in fishing gear is one of the most significant threats globally to the conservation and welfare of marine species including seabirds. Defra have recently published the Marine Wildlife Bycatch Mitigation Initiative. This will identify policy objectives and actions to achieve part of the Fisheries Act’s ecosystem objective, including improving our understanding of where and how much bycatch occurs and implementing effective mitigation measures to minimise or eliminate bycatch.

16.3 Defra have commissioned Natural England to assess the vulnerability of seabird species in light of the pressures they are facing, and to propose recommendations to address them.

16.4 Working with Natural England and JNCC, Defra are committed to establish a stakeholder working group to explore additional conservation actions that may be needed to support the recovery of population of wild birds which have been significantly impacted by avian influenza. The proposed working group will be in addition to the existing stakeholder forums where latest situation updates on the outbreak of avian influenza in both wild and kept birds are shared together with horizon scanning information from APHA’s international disease monitoring programme.

16.5 Welsh Government have established a stakeholder group which discusses the current avian influenza situation including preparedness and additional actions needed to mitigate the spread of avian influenza and support the recovery of wild bird populations. In addition, Welsh Government are developing a seabird strategy which will assess the vulnerability of seabird species and identify a number of high-level actions to support the conservation of seabirds given these pressures and threats.

16.6 Defra and Welsh Government are engaging with Oil Spill Prevention, Administration and Response (OSPAR) Heads of Delegation and WOAH to share best practice, mitigation measures and lessons identified from current and previous outbreaks.

16.7 While there is an increasing body of evidence on the impact that avian influenza is having on some BoCC5 species of seabird, the H5N1 outbreak which commenced on the 26 October 2021 has not yet concluded at time of publication. As such, as well as being unprecedented in its scale and the breadth of species affected, the H5N1 avian influenza outbreak should still be considered an evolving situation. Species population monitoring may reveal further species which have been significantly impacted in the short term, together with further information on how resilient species are with regard to recovering from the impacts of avian influenza. The potential for further incursion and circulation of additional strains of avian influenza and further new species being impacted can also not be discounted.

17.1 This section of guidance is aimed at landowners and organisations responsible for natural areas where the general public have access to, or do activities involving wild birds.

17.2 Contingency plans consider possible scenarios that may arise in the future, designing strategies to manage these potential risks and threats. Contingency planning is essential for ensuring a rapid, coordinated and well informed response to animal disease outbreaks can occur. Organisations responsible for the management of land where wild birds may be found should have contingency plans in place in the event that there is an increased risk of avian influenza being detected on their land or that avian influenza is in birds whether kept or wild on their land. These contingency plans should be integrated into the general site management plans and be readily available to staff, and staff should be familiar and trained in their operation in advance.

17.3 Communication is a key measure in mitigating risk of transmission of avian influenza between birds and protecting public health. During periods of increased risk from avian influenza signage should be displayed at key access and other points on sites warning the general public of the risk of avian influenza and the measures they can take to protect themselves and both kept and wild birds from avian influenza. Example posters are provided by the APHA and are available for use via GOV.UK/Bird-Flu. Assessments of the national risk of incursion of avian influenza are published on GOV.UK/bird-flu.

17.4 Cleansing and disinfection, localised or targeted use of disinfectants including cleansing and disinfection of clothing, footwear, equipment and vehicles, should be considered at key access points to sites and activities where people or equipment come into contact with wild birds or their environment. However appropriate use and disposal of disinfectants so they do not damage the environment is essential. The list of Defra-approved disinfectants sets out which products should be used for avian influenza, and the concentration of the disinfectant you must use. Further information is provided on GOV.UK in the Defra-approved disinfectants guidance.

17.5 Spraying of the environment with disinfectant is considered counter-productive, harmful to the environment and not effective from a disease control perspective.

18.1 All disease prevention and control measures are kept under regular review and are based on the latest scientific, ornithological and veterinary advice.

18.2.1 In England, based on currently available evidence, additional restrictions on bird ringing due to avian influenza are not recommended. However, this position is being kept under regular review by Defra, Natural England and the BTO. A risk-based approach, taking into account site and species knowledge, is most appropriate, and BTO will consider restrictions on bird ringing activities due to avian influenza where it is deemed appropriate to do so.

18.2.2 In Wales, NRW will consider restrictions on bird ringing activities due to avian influenza where it is deemed appropriate to do so. However, the position is kept under regular review by Welsh Government, NRW and the BTO. A risk-based approach, taking into account site and species knowledge, is most appropriate. Where active suspensions on ringing are in place in Wales, NRW will consider requests for exemptions where the value of the data collected is deemed to be significant with respect to national monitoring priorities, including those relating to avian influenza impact assessment.

18.2.3 Natural England and NRW would not expect ringing to occur within seabird colonies where avian influenza is suspected or confirmed. However, visits to colonies by ringers to assess colony health, check affected birds for rings, and carry out standard monitoring can yield valuable data if they can be undertaken in a manner in which health and safety concerns can be addressed and the risk of onward transmission can be managed. Even where colonies are not showing signs of infection, it is not safe to assume that the virus is not circulating, and appropriate biosecurity and hygiene precautions should be adopted when carrying out any activities within or near any seabird colony.

18.2.4 Ringing activity is undertaken by ornithologists, researchers and volunteers overseen by the BTO on behalf of the UK Nature Conservation agencies. Bird ringers should follow the latest BTO guidance for volunteer fieldworkers regarding bird welfare and biosecurity.

18.3.1 For areas where an Avian Influenza Prevention Zone (AIPZ) is in force access to areas where poultry and other captive birds are kept must be restricted to only essential personnel.

18.3.2 In addition, access to premises where notifiable avian influenza has been confirmed in poultry or other captive birds is restricted. Access to infected premises would only be permitted following a veterinary risk assessment and under licence from the APHA.

18.3.3 Outside of these restrictions, there is no legal requirement for government, local authorities or landowners to limit access to public areas or close rights of way due to avian influenza.

18.3.4 However, where findings of avian influenza in wild birds have occurred in public areas, local authorities and other land managers may take a precautionary approach to protect the health and welfare of birds and to limit the risk of infection being transferred on footwear etc to other areas by restricting access to areas where wild birds frequently congregate where this does not impact public rights of way. Applying access restrictions should be assessed by land managers on a case-by-case basis.

18.4.1 Defra and Welsh Government have explored the benefit of introducing wildfowl hunting restrictions to help limit the spread of avian influenza.

18.4.2 Expert opinion provided by the Ornithological Expert Panel (OEP) (see Section 9 for further details on the OEP) and associated risk assessment during the HPAI H5N8 outbreak in 2016 and 2017 concluded that wildfowling, or more general shooting of ducks and geese, would not significantly increase the risk for immediate long distance spread of avian influenza infected wild birds due to the low number of people or guns utilised in any one wildfowling event, and considering these species are highly mobile during their normal day-to-day activity. Driven game shoots were considered a lower risk due to the limited dispersal of managed wild game. Expert opinion considered that these birds usually fly only short distances from one area of cover to another and are not flying over long distances when disturb by shooting activity. However in contrast to wildfowling events a greater number of people will be involved in this type of shoot. Pigeon shooting was considered to be an even lower risk, as it is generally used as pest control around crops. As such these activities would have a minimal impact on immediate long distance dispersal of birds around a region, above their normal daily movements, with a likely local and temporary redistribution of birds. Therefore, these activities represented a very low risk of increasing (above existing levels) the geographic spread of wild birds infected with avian influenza over long distances or into new areas.

18.4.3 In light of the substantial additional information generated from the widespread outbreaks of avian influenza during 2021 and 2022, Defra in conjunction with Welsh Government and Scottish Government commissioned an updated risk assessment undertaken by APHA on what impact water-fowling, driven game shooting and woodpigeon shooting could have the immediate long-distance dispersal of wild birds, and how that could impact on the geographic spread of wild birds infected with HPAI.

18.4.4 The updated risk assessment has been published and reaffirms the conclusion of the earlier assessment that at the time of publication wildfowling, driven game shooting and pigeon shooting activities are not considered to significantly increase the risk for long distance dispersal beyond that of routine movement of infected wild birds. Further updates to the risk assessment are in progress and will consider the shooting of pheasants. Updates to the risk assessment will be published and this document updated as appropriate to the outcomes.

18.4.5 While the risk assessment considers the generic risk and impacts from shooting land managers should review on a case-by-case basis the impact shooting activities may have on species of conservation concern which are present on or close to their land.

18.4.6 We actively work with shooting and game keeping organisations to communicate biosecurity best practice to waterfowlers and others involved in the gamekeeping community.

18.4.7 The information on the evidence which supports this assessment is available in the risk assessment published in APHA’s outbreak and risk assessments collection.

18.4.8 Further restrictions on shooting activities may be applied if an avian influenza strain of significant public health concern is detected in wild birds (see section 19 for further information)

18.5.1 Some species of wildlife have legal protection. Natural England and NRW issue licences on behalf of Defra in England and Welsh Government in Wales respectively that allow activities affecting protected species that are otherwise prohibited. Some of these licences allow lethal control. In England, Defra also issue three general licences for controlling certain wild birds for different purposes. You do not need to apply for a general licence but you must comply with the licence conditions.

18.5.2 Before issuing a licence, the wildlife licencing authorities in England and Wales carefully consider the circumstances of a case, the justification for it and the impact on the species as a whole in accordance with the latest evidence.

18.6.1 Release of game birds is not permitted in disease control zones surrounding infected premises where avian influenza has been confirmed in poultry or other captive birds (England: Schedule 4, paragraph 13 SI 2006/2702; Wales: Schedule 4, paragraph 13 SI 2006/2927). Definitive requirements within disease control zones currently in force can be found for England on GOV.UK in the Avian Influenza Cases and Disease Control Zones in England guidance and in Wales on GOV.WALES in the Avian Influenza Latest Situation Update guidance. The location of disease control zones currently in force can be viewed using the APHA avian influenza interactive map.

18.6.2 The evidence which underpins our response to avian influenza outbreaks are published on GOV.UK through the APHA outbreak and risk assessments. In light of the substantial additional information generated from the widespread outbreaks of avian influenza during 2021 to 2022, Defra and Welsh Government in conjunction with the Scottish Government have commissioned updated risk assessments to be undertaken by APHA on what impact game bird releases have on transmission of avian influenza in wild birds, and between wild birds and kept birds to ensure our approach to disease control in poultry and captive birds, reflects any risk these activities pose. Once finalised these risk assessments will be published as part of the ‘Animal diseases: international and UK monitoring’ collection, and this document updated as appropriate to the outcomes.

18.6.3 Noting that whilst not concerned with addressing avian influenza risk, in England, you must not release common pheasants or red-legged partridges into the wild on European sites or within 500 metres of their boundary (known as the buffer zone), except under licence. In Wales, releasing gamebirds on land outside the boundary of an SSSI or European site does not currently require consent or licence from NRW.

18.6.4 Gamebird General Licence GL43 (which applies to England only) allows an authorised person to release a specified number of common pheasants or red-legged partridges into the wild in an area which is a European site and within the 500m buffer zone around the boundary of the site.

18.6.5 Condition 3 of the Gamebird General Licence requires individuals releasing 50 or more gamebirds to report the number of released birds to Natural England. Where individuals cannot comply with the requirements set out in GL43, they may still apply to Natural England for an individual licence.

18.6.6 Government have joined with organisations involved in gamebird management to issue guidance on avian influenza and the way it can affect the activities of gamebird rearers. This guidance has been prepared by game shooting, research, and game conservation bodies. It is endorsed by Defra, Scottish Government, Welsh Government and DAERA in Northern Ireland and is available on the Game Farmers Association Website.

19.1 There are five strains of avian influenza that have caused public health concern in in recent years: H7N9, H9N2, H5N6, H5N8 and a type of H5N1 strain more common in Asia. None of these strains easily infect people and are not usually spread from human to human, however a small number of people have been infected around the world and so we take precautionary steps to mitigate this risk as much as possible.

19.2 UKHSA and PHW monitor public health risks related to avian influenza including close collaboration with APHA in relation to reported detections of HPAI in England and Wales respectively. Further information is available in UKHSA’s pages Avian influenza: guidance, data and analysis.

19.3 Where an avian influenza strain with significant public health concern (as assessed by the UKHSA and PHW for England and Wales respectively) is detected in wild birds, additional control measures may be put in place surrounding the wild bird finding.

19.4 Potential actions which may be taken in this scenario are set out in the Notifiable Avian Influenza Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain. Their application will be subject to a veterinary risk assessment based on expert opinion, ornithological advice, in addition to the consideration of trade implications and UKHSA and PHW’s public health advice.

19.5 In summary, measures taken may include the declaration of wild bird control area (WBCA) and wild bird monitoring area (WBMA) surrounding findings in wild birds. The size and shape of these areas may be based on an assessment of the risk of disease spreading to poultry or other captive birds taking into account:

19.6 When zone surrounding findings of avian influenza in wild birds are declared movement restrictions may apply within the WBCA and WBMA to poultry and captive birds and items associated with their keeping, for example poultry litter and poultry products (see the Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain for further details). Enhanced biosecurity potentially including housing measure may also apply to poultry and other captive birds in the areas. The definitive requirements and who and what they apply to within any WBCA or WBMA in force will be set out in the declaration for the area published for England on GOV.UK Avian Influenza Cases and Disease Control Zones in England and for Wales on GOV.WALES in the Avian Influenza Latest Situation Update guidance and their locations viewed using the APHA avian influenza interactive map.

19.7 When declared, a WBCA must remain in force for at least 21 days from the date of collection of samples from the infected wild bird, unless indicated by successful completion of all surveillance in poultry and other captive birds required in the area, no suspect premises under investigation in the area and the favourable outcome of a veterinary risk assessment.

19.8 When revoked following the successful completion of any relevant disease control and surveillance activities the area which comprised the WBCA is merged with and becomes part of the WBMA. WBMAs must remain in force for at least 30 days from the date of collection of samples from the infected wild bird. WBMAs will only be revoked following the successful completion of any disease control and surveillance activities required within the area.

19.9 While the majority of restrictions and surveillance activities within WBCA and WBMA’s apply to poultry and other captive birds, other restrictions may be applied to activities associated with wild birds, including the prohibition of hunting of wild birds or ‘otherwise take them from the wild’ in a WBCA or WBMA except under licence (England: SI 2006/3249, Schedule 1, para 17 and Wales: SI 2006/3310, Schedule 1, para 17). The same legislation also prevents the release of game birds in the same zone (England: SI 2006/3249, Schedule 1, para 18 and Wales SI 2006/3310 Schedule 1, para 18 ). All decisions on whether to apply these control measures within any WBCA or WBMA in force will be subject to the outcome of a veterinary risk assessment containing the latest ornithological, veterinary and scientific advice supported by public health risk assessments.

20.1 The control of avian influenza infection in wild bird populations through a stamping out policy, as used in poultry or other captive birds, is not considered effective or feasible from a logistical, environmental and biodiversity perspective.

20.2 While powers exist to cull wild birds, it is not current policy to cull wild birds as part of avian influenza control, and Defra and Welsh Government support the advice of the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and WOAH, and our international obligations under Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS), the Ramsar Convention and the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA), to ensure that there is no consideration of killing of wild birds for avian influenza disease control.

20.3 However, euthanasia of wild birds by suitably qualified veterinary practitioners on welfare grounds may be utilised where appropriate. In England and Wales sick or otherwise injured birds should be reported to the RSPCA (0300 1234 999) who dependent on the situation may be able to offer assistance. This may include an in‑situ assessment where available actions will be assessed including euthanasia and disposal if appropriate.

21.1 Wild birds are susceptible to a range of diseases and injuries and not all dead birds will have been infected with avian influenza. However, our general advice to the general public is to not touch or pick up any dead or visibly sick birds that they find.

21.2 Where dead birds are not required for avian influenza surveillance purposes, they may be eligible for other surveillance schemes such as DoWS or WIIS . However, there are many reasons why birds die, and further investigation is not required or warranted in many circumstances.

21.3 In general, we do not recommend that wild bird carcasses are removed. If removal is warranted (see below) it is the landowner’s responsibility to safely arrange disposal of the carcasses. Landowners are responsible for any costs associated with removal and disposal of dead wild birds. Where dead birds are on public land it is the local authority’s responsibility to arrange disposal of the carcasses.

21.4 Keepers must ensure any wild bird carcasses are removed from areas where poultry, other captive birds or other kept susceptible species have access to or areas which are associated with their keeping, for example bedding storage areas. Outside of these areas there is no obligation on landowners or local authorities to remove found dead wild birds when they are not causing a public hygiene risk, however consideration of their removal is recommended when dead wild birds are found:

21.5 The carcasses of wild animals, other than wild game, are exempt from the animal by-product (ABP) rules in the UK. Unless it is suspected that the animals were infected with a disease which can spread to people or animals such as avian influenza, the carcasses must be disposed of as a category 1 ABP. See our guidance on animal by-product disposal for further information.

21.6 Derogations from the rules governing ABP disposal of wild birds suspected of being infected with avian influenza may be available in a very limited set of situations, including disposal in remote areas. Derogations must be approved by APHA and will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. For further information contact the APHA ABP team at csconehealthabp@apha.gov.uk. Additional authorisations from the Environment Agency, Natural England, NRW and other relevant agencies may also be required dependant on the situation.

21.7 During the 2021 into 2022 outbreak mortality in some seabird colonies has been very high. However, there is limited evidence to indicate whether removal of carcasses reduces transmission risk within seabird colonies given the significant levels of environmental contamination that will remain in the area where carcasses have been removed from and the close contact between birds in these colonies.

21.8 There is however emerging evidence from seabird colonies in Continental Europe that carcass removal may be effective in reducing incidence in some species when the risk of movement of the virus around the colonies by carcass collectors can be mitigated, together with the welfare impacts of entering the colony areas. Removal in these areas should be assessed by land managers on a case-by-case basis with site accessibility, ability to dispose of carcasses in line with ABP disposal rules and the health protection of those involved in the removal of carcasses being a significant consideration in whether to proceed with removal.

21.9 If landowners or managers decide to proceed with carcass removal all necessary arrangements for appropriate disposal in line with ABP disposal requirements including where relevant successful application for and receipt of relevant authorisations or derogations for disposal via alternative methods, must be in place prior to commencing removal and disposal activities.

21.10 As further evidence on the effectiveness of carcass removal on reducing incidence of avian influenza in wild birds emerges from sites in the UK or overseas, this guidance will be updated to reflect any relevant evidence.

21.11 Members of the public and land managers are advised to check the current guidance on reporting of dead wild birds. If the finding meets the threshold for reporting, they should contact the Defra Helpline (03459 33 55 77) to report the dead wild birds, unless it is clear that the cause of death is trauma.

21.12 Further information on disposal routes of dead wild birds not required for surveillance purposes are provided below. This guidance is applicable to incidents where the where the risk to public health from the circulating avian influenza virus is determined as either a low or very low risk to public health as assessed by UKHSA. Details of risk levels relevant strains will be published on the avian influenza guidance.

There are many reasons why birds die and so not every dead bird should be considered to have died of avian influenza. Advice for the disposal of small numbers of dead wild garden birds (for example black birds, magpies, tits, finches, collared dove, woodpigeons, robins) found on domestic premises is outlined below and can also be found at GOV.UK/Bird-Flu and GOV. WALES/ report and dispose of dead birds.

If the birds are not required for surveillance, residents should follow the government advice for their disposal through one of the two following options (disposal in household waste or burial).

It should be noted that this is most applicable to smaller bird species due to the physical challenges of handling and disposing of larger birds. If a bird carcass is too large for effective bagging and disposal in domestic waste, residents should follow the advice in scenario 2.

There is a higher suspicion of avian influenza when there are deaths of multiple birds in a specified location. There is also greater uncertainty if the found dead wild birds are not typical garden bird species (for example. black birds, magpies, tits, finches, collared dove, woodpigeons, robins). Therefore additional precautions for the collection and disposal of birds in these scenarios is advised.

If the birds are not required for surveillance, residents should dispose of the carcasses by:

Individuals involved with collection and disposal of ABP should follow the PPE guidance as outlined in Scenario 3 below. Exceptions include when avian influenza is not suspected, see Scenario 4 for further information.

This scenario includes, but is not to limited to, the following:

Where dead birds are on public land, and where a decision has been made to remove and dispose the carcasses, it is the local authority’s responsibility to safely dispose of the carcasses as ABP Category 1 material. Local authorities may themselves have a contract with specialist providers to ensure that the dead birds are collected and disposed of biosecurely in line with ABP guidance.

Where the land is privately owned, and where a decision has been made to remove and dispose of the carcasses, it is the landowner’s responsibility to safely dispose of the carcasses as ABP Category 1 material by:

Individuals involved in collection and disposal will need the appropriate personal protective equipment PPE including:

Footwear should be cleansed and disinfected and coveralls either disposed or washed. Staff should receive training to cover the safe methods required including getting PPE on and off without contamination, for example removing single-use gloves without contaminating your hands.

The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) provide further advice on PPE in relation to avian influenza risks in their ‘Avoiding the risk of infection when working with poultry that is suspected of having H5 or H7 notifiable avian influenza’ guidance document.

The activities outlined in Scenario 3 may also require consideration of antiviral prophylaxis and human health surveillance, where avian influenza is confirmed or in specific circumstances (see national guidance for managing the human health risk of avian influenza in poultry and wild birds for further details). UKHSA in England and PHW in Wales will provide advice on this when notified of such incidents.

Where there is no suspicion of a disease communicable to humans or animals, and a decision has been taken by the landowner to remove the carcasses, the carcasses of wild animals, other than wild game (including game birds), are exempt from the ABP rules in the UK. The determination of whether avian influenza is suspected in any given scenario should be informed by the individual circumstances of the situation and the national picture with regard to avian influenza outbreaks in poultry and other captive birds or findings in wild birds.

Individuals involved in collection and disposal are advised where applicable to follow their employer’s COSHH and health and safety procedures for the disposal of carcasses and, as a minimum:

For larger volumes of dead wild birds a specialist waste contractor may need to be utilised to facilitate removal.

21.13.1 Any birds found wearing a metal ring with a museum or institute address, where the details on the ring can safely be viewed, please make a note of the full ring number and address and report the details via www.ring.ac. Birds may also be wearing plain or inscribed colour rings and where the metal ring is not present or detectable these colour marks can also be reported via the appropriate page at www.ring.ac. Please make a note of both the colour of the ring(s) and the colour and details of any inscription as well as the position of the rings and on which leg where possible.

22.1 Defra and Welsh Government have no plans to vaccinate the wild bird population against avian influenza.

22.2 Defra’s policy on vaccination is set out in the Notifiable Avian Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain and in separate avian influenza (bird flu) vaccination guidance. In summary, in England it is Defra’s current policy to not permit the vaccination of birds (outside of premises with a current zoo licence) as an immediate disease control response. Stamping out coupled with a high standard of biosecurity, separation of poultry from wild birds and careful surveillance for signs of disease remain the most effective means of controlling the disease in kept birds and protecting other animals, including preventing spill back of infection in poultry and other captive birds to wild birds. This policy is in line with international standards of best practice for disease control.

22.3 Wales currently has a no-vaccination policy.

22.4 Currently available avian influenza vaccines have disadvantages in that while they may reduce mortality, it is possible that some vaccinated birds would still be capable of transmitting the disease if they became infected whilst not displaying clinical signs. This would increase the time taken to detect and eradicate the virus.

22.5 Avian influenza vaccination policy is kept under regular review in light of any scientific developments in the availability of effective vaccines. In practice, existing vaccines and those currently under development can only be administered via injection. This precludes any widespread use in wild birds.

23.1 Compensation, as set out in the Animal Health Act 1981, is not payable for wild birds or for consequential losses, including business interruption caused by control measures and other costs associated with avian influenza in wild birds, for example disposal costs.

23.2 Compensation is paid for other things that have to be seized by government because they pose a risk of transmitting disease. This will be at the value of the item at the time of seizure (and could mean that the item has very little or even no value if it is considered contaminated following a veterinary risk assessment).

24.1 Avian influenza controls are enforced by Local Authorities Animal Health Function (LAAHF), which is normally situated with the Trading Standards or Environmental Health Service of a local authority. See the Chartered Institute of Trading Standards postcode tool to find details of how to contact your LAAHF with any reports of non-compliance. Find details of your Local Authority using the postcode tool.

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